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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, the main role of the bank is to offer loans to its customers, to facilitate the 
intermediary role in the financial market between the investors and feed the need of the big 
corporations in terms of investment. This study is an attempt to analyze, at the same time, the 
impact of three factors that are involved in the income of the European banks. The first two are 
endogenous to the bank and the third one is deemed, a priori, to be exogenous to the bank. Our 
objective is to look at the influence of “Fee & commissions”, the “Net Non-interest income” and the 
interest rate on banks’ profitability in a panel data of 34 banks chosen from different European 
countries. The interest rate of reference is supposed to be under the control of the central bank but 
subject to movement due to the interactions between the cross-border countries and the competitive 
framework within the same country. The “Fee & commissions” and the “Net Non-interest income” 
are more related to the efficiency of the management team and the effectiveness of the processing 
inside the same bank. Our main finding is that the “Fee & commissions” are not really influencing 
the profitability of the European banks. However, the “Net Non-interest income” and the interest 
rate are significantly impacting the profitability of the European banks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In a perfect competitive market, all banks should charge the same fees and commissions for similar 
services. To reach this objective, convergence in cost efficiency of banks is required since large 
differences in banking costs prevent banking prices from converging. Therefore, the investigation of 
convergence in cost efficiency of banks involves the degree of banking integration in the EU. 
However, that requires us to examine the importance of interest rate on the profitability of the banks. 
 
Our aim is on the one hand, to assess the impact of both internal factors of the European banks the 
“fees and commissions” and “non-interest Income” and, on the other hand, the influence of the 
interest rate of the country for the European Universal banking sector during the recent years. Both 
“fees and commissions” and “non-interest Income” are in the hand of the management of the bank 
and its relation with its own customers, the latter is a consequence of the monetary policy and the 
financial framework of the country. We estimate those parameters of European banks with the Panel 
technique approach. We then, analyze the issue of coming back to the equilibrium and the speed of 
this convergence. One great point of this analysis is the application of whole process of panel tests 
on banking efficiency measures. 
 
We make use of two major concepts of Panel techniques: Estimating Long-run relationship with 
Dynamic OLS and the use of Panel VECM Granger causality with GMM, in particular the 
convergence to the equilibrium will be examined for both ROE and ROA. The short-term and long-
term relationship with the dependent variable and the explanatory variables will be analyzed using 
Wald F-test, panel Granger causality Beta-convergence and Sigma-convergence. Beta-convergence 
implies that countries with a lower level of banking efficiency have faster growth rates than 
countries with a higher level of banking efficiency. Convergence is observed if each country’s level 
of banking efficiency is converging to the average level of the group of countries. 
 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 1 (Background) develops the evolution of the 
European banking sector over the last decade. 
 
First, we will test the unit root, the long run and short run relationship between ROE (and ROA) 
where the variables are considered as independent. We provide also, the equations of FE, RE, and 
the DFE the measure of PMG and MG. Haussman test will be used to make a choice between the 
three models.  
 
DOLS and Panel VECM Granger causality with GMM will be used in section 2. 
 
 Section 3 outlines the methodology used for the cost efficiency measures and the convergence tests. 
Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 develops the empirical results. Finally, we 
provide some concluding remarks in Section 6 
2. Literature review 
In his paper Fung (2006) has made a performing test of convergence on banking efficiency 
measures for the US bank holding companies. Thus, the objectives were far different from the 
investigation on the convergence in pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
 
Many works have tried to extend the established literature on banking efficiency in European 
countries notably (e.g. Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001, 2002). In this latter strand of literature, several 
papers have investigated banking efficiency in European countries to analyze, specifically, the 
cross-country differences. Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) notably estimated a cross-country production 
frontier on a sample of banks from 10 European countries with the non-parametric DEA approach. 
Vander Vennet (2002) investigated cost and profit efficiency on a sample of banks from 17 
European countries. The main conclusion of these papers is the existence of substantial 
discrepancies in banking efficiency across European countries. However several studies have 
underlined the fact that, after controlling for environment, cross-country differences in banking 
efficiency are substantially reduced (Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Carbo Valverde et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, a few studies have investigated the evolution of banking efficiency in the European 
countries since the nineties so as to provide evidence on the effects of European integration on 
banking efficiency. 
 
Most of these works conclude in favor of an increase in efficiency for the European banks 
(Altunbas et al., 2001; Carbo Valverde et al., 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003), even if some papers 
provide more ambiguous results (Schure et al., 2004; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). 
 
The adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 was a very important moment in integration of 
European market, stating the completion of the single market through the free circulation of people, 
goods and services, and capital in 1992. This was the very starting point of banking integration in 
the European with the adoption of the Directive on Liberalization on Capital Flows in 1988, and 
more particularly the Second Banking Directive in 1989. This latter text established the single 
banking license: any bank authorized to provide banking services in a European state was from then 
on allowed to provide banking services in another European state. In practice, by reducing legal 
barriers to entry on foreign banking markets, this directive was expected to favor the cross-border 
expansion of banking services through either the creation of branches or the supply of cross-border 
financial services. The creation of subsidiaries was not favored as they were still submitted to the 
control of the host country authority.  The creation of the single currency in 1999 was another step 
taken towards an integrated European banking market, as it removed the exchange risk for banks in 
the cross-border acquisitions and in the supply of cross-border services. However the way to the 
integration of the banking markets was still punctuated with legal obstacles. Therefore, the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was launched in 1999 to be implemented in 2005. This plan 
had three aims: the creation of a single European wholesale market for financial services and 
products, the creation of an open and secure financial retail market, and the implementation of state 
of the art prudential rules and supervision. Therefore, it aimed to implement integrated wholesale 
banking markets, and to develop the prudential regulation and the openness of the retail banking 
markets. It was then a set of 42 measured intended to reach these aims. 
 
Consequently, the analysis of the legal efforts to promote banking integration in the European 
shows major changes. Indeed, great efforts have been performed in particular through the Second 
Banking Directive and the Liberalization of Capital Flows, reducing the legal barriers to entry. 
However, some legal obstacles such as the consumer protection rules and the tax rules remain. We 
turn now to the evolution of the structure of the European banking markets, to analyze notably the 
outcome of these legal changes. 
 
Yafeh and Yosha (2001) showed that banks can implement barriers to entry by increasing their 
customership, so that the switching costs for the customers (resulting among others from the best 
information owned by the bank on its borrower) prevent the potential competitors from enter the 
market. Therefore, the expectations of new competitors may have incited European banks to 
increase the number of branches so as to have a larger customership. This behavior may have 
reached its peak in countries with poor levels of banking efficiency, as banks originating from these 
countries are the most threatened by foreign competition. 
 
The consequences of these changes on banking competition can then be measured. Several works 
have then shown the absence of increased competition during the nineties and the first half of the 
current decade. Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) support the absence of increased competition on 
European banking markets during the 90s. They compute a Lerner index of market power for the 
banking sectors of the five biggest European countries between 1992 and 1999. 
 In a related study, Goddard et al. (2004) investigate profitability of European banks in six European 
countries between 1992 and 1998 and observe a significant persistence of abnormal profit during 
that period. 
 
The absence of increased competition in the European banking sectors during the 90s may seem 
surprising, as there is consensual evidence regarding the reduction of margins in these sectors. 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) however explain how the fall of margins in European 
banking was compatible with a relaxation of competitive conditions, and notably an increase of 
market power, during that period. They indeed show that European banks benefited during the 90s 
from a reduction of interest rate risk, credit risk, and also of operating costs which allow them to 
reduce their margins without decreasing their market power. 
 
To sum it up, Dermine (2003) stressed that the effects on banking integration from the Second 
Banking Directive may have been an illusion.    
 
It appears relevant to analyze the impact of “fees and commissions”  and the interest rate, to assess 
the effective effects of banking integration on the behavior of banks. Indeed, even if there was no 
increase of competition, banking behavior may for instance have been affected by the 
implementation of the Euro and the expected cross-border mergers. Furthermore, competition 
policy from European authorities may have shrunk the possibilities of collusion for banks. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Data are taken from the Bloomberg and completed in a minor way by “Bankscope” database.  
Bankscope includes both consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data. To make sure that 
observations are not duplicated for the same bank, the following procedure was applied to include 
information from only one of the balance sheets. First using the "consolidated code" variable in 
Bankscope we choose institutions, which will provide one balance sheet for each institution at the 
higher level of consolidation available. In a second step, we add those banks not included in the first 
step for which data are available. We use financial data for a sample of banks from 9 European 
countries (France, Germany,  Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland ). The 
data needed at the level of the country ( macro variables like GDP, inflation, interest rate and stock 
market) have been taken from BIS Historical Statistics database, for each year and each country. 
 
The lack of sufficient data in our database concerning the other European countries brought us not 
to include all European countries. This sample of 9 European countries is however satisfactory for 
an investigation of the evolution in banking efficiency in European countries, as it includes the 
major European countries.  Our sample includes only some European banks. The period of 
observation stretches from 2000 up to 2009, since we cannot get the data for some banks for the 
year 2010. We use only balanced panel, as the choice of a unbalanced sample would create more 
disparities in the measurement of fees and commissions. Indeed, we could not take into account the 
banks gone into bankrupt and those being absorbed during this period. Data sets for banks with 
observations out of the range 2000 – 2009 were dropped. These criteria produce a sample of 340 
observations. 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The bank collects deposits to transform them, using labor and capital, into loans as opposed to the 
production approach, which views the bank as using labor and capital to produce deposits and loans. 
Two outputs are included: loans, and investment assets. The inputs, whose prices are used to 
estimate the cost frontier, include labor, physical capital and borrowed funds. As data on the number 
of employees are not available, the price of labor is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets, following Altunbas et al. (2001) and Maudos et al. (2002) among others. The price of 
physical capital is defined as the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets. The price of 
borrowed funds is measured by the ratio of paid interests to all funding. Total costs are the sum of 
personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and paid interest. 
 
Time-series and cross-sectional data (panel data) have been used for this paper. The first estimation 
in such cases is Dynamic Heterogeneous panel technique. The sample included banks that have 
different sizes and are widely dispersed in terms of efficiency. This factor has to be considered as 
the firm-specific effect. The Fixed Effects method solves this problem and allows us to take into 
consideration the firm-specific effects on regression estimations. However this model does not take 
into consideration the time effect. It would be robust only under the omission of any relevant time-
varying factors. Hence this study will implement the Random Effects Model, which besides 
incorporating the firm-specifics effects takes into consideration the time effects. The equation of 
Random Effects Model 
 
3.2.1. Variables 
 
We have included in the regressions as dependent variables the two basic instruments that 
authorities use to control bank's profitability: ROA and, ROE. 
 
Additionally, we have also included control variables related to the financial development of the 
country, macro variables and other banks variables. We limit our study to the following additional 
information about: 
 The level of inflation, and the interest rate 
 Stock market to GDP of each country from BIS Historical Statistics database. 
 
(see the table in the Appendix 1) 
 
List of Variables: 
 
Bank characteristics according to Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) will include: 
 
 ROE ( Return to Equity ) related and ROA ( Return to Assets ) 
 Income or banks’ interest margin ( P_NII ) is the interest income minus interest expense 
over total assets and it captures the profitability of the intermediation activity of banks, 
 LOANS to Deposit ( L2DEP ), bank loans bring, in general, the main source of income to 
the bank and are expected to have a positive impact on bank profitability. 
 Net non-interest earnings ( P_NNII ) and 
 Banks overhead cost to total assets ( P_OPEX ) is used to provide information on variation 
in bank costs. It reflects employment, total amount of salaries and cost of running the 
facilities offered by the bank. Overhead is expected to have a negative impact on 
performance because efficient bank should operate at lower costs. 
 The variable “Fee and commissions” ( PFC ) represents the income of the bank as in 
intermediary or agent for the customer 
We note that, except for L2DEP, the total banks’ assets divide all these previous banks’ variables in 
each year. 
 
Since they are macro variables potentially affecting banks' profitability in each country, we include: 
 The interest rate  ( INT ) and, 
 the inflation rate ( INF ) 
 
For measuring the volume and activity of the banking sector, Beck et al (2001) proposed to control 
the development of the financial system, those variables. To measure the size of the banking sector 
we use: 
• The size of the stock market is replaced by the ratio of the stock market capitalization 
divided by GDP (S2GDP), as a proxy.                                                                             
 
To measure credit activity of the banking sector, we would use a proxy:    
• The credit to the private sector by deposit money banks divided by GDP. 
This variable will not be used, since it is not easy to get it. 
 
However, we will not use the national regulatory restrictions such the index of restrictions on banks 
owning non-financial firms elaborated by Barth et al. (2001b) since the portion of the equity 
investment still small in regard to the principal activity of giving a loans. 
 
Net income is net interest income plus non-interest earnings minus overhead cost and provides a 
measure of bank profits before provisions and taxes. 
 
As the capital gains or losses and dividends of firms' shares are included in the net income but not 
in the net interest income, the relationship between banks’ equity investments and banks’ net 
income would depict not only the effect on the banks’ lending relationship but also on the direct 
yields (capital gains or losses, dividends) that banks get from the investment in the firm’s equity. 
We will use the two main variables, as dependant variable one after the other, ROE and ROA.   
 
So the relationship between profitability and these variables can be described by the following 
equation presented in the next sub-section. 
 
3.2.2.  The model 
 
INit =α + β Bit +γ Mit +δ FDit +μi +ηit 
 
where: 
• INit    is the dependent variable (either ROE or ROA) for country i in year t, 
• Bit   are banks’ variables for country i in year t, 
• Mit  represents the macro variables, 
• FDit  are the financial development variables, 
• μi   is a Country Specific effect and, 
• ηit   is a white-noise error term. 
 
 
This section is devoted to the presentation of our results. We first display the main findings. We then 
provide some robustness checks. We attempt afterwards to provide some explanations. 
The table in Appendix 1 is giving the details of the variables used. 
4. Results and Discussions based on Multivariate Analysis 
 
4.1. Unit root 
 
The availability of a panel data enables us to analyze country-specific and time-specific effects.  
Unit root has been tested for ROA as independent variable) using HADRI test , see results 1 annex 
II. According to HADRI test, the variables: ROA, banks’ interest margin ( P_NII ), Net non-interest 
earnings ( P_NNII ), “Fee and commissions” ( PFC ), banks overhead cost to total assets 
( P_OPEX ) are non stationary. 
 
However, ROA, banks’ interest margin ( P_NII ), Net non-interest earnings ( P_NNII ), “Fee and 
commissions” ( PFC ), The ratio of the stock market capitalization divided by GDP (S2GDP) Are 
stationary all together. 
 
Also, Unit root has been tested for ROE  (as independent variable) using IPS test ( Im. Pesaran and 
Shin) with three different equation as it is allowed by the system, see results 2 annex II. According 
to IPS test, the variables presented in the two following equations have at least one endogenous 
variable. The Inflation seems to be the good candidate for that. 
It seems to be difficult to find out the endogenous variable, but we suggest the ROE itself since this 
one is depending of the others as we can see in the three following equations:  
First equation: 
ROE is a function of: banks’ interest margin ( P_NII ), Net non-interest earnings ( P_NNII ), “Fee 
and commissions” ( PFC ) and banks overhead cost to total assets ( P_OPEX ) 
ROE =  f(  inf, int, s2gdp ) 
Second equation: 
ROE = f( nii, nnii, inf, int ) 
ROE is a function of: banks’ interest margin ( P_NII ), Net non-interest earnings ( P_NNII ), , banks 
overhead cost to total assets ( P_OPEX ) 
Third equation: 
ROE = f( nii, nnii, loans2dep, pfc) 
ROE is a function of: banks’ interest margin (P_NII), Net non-interest earnings (P_NNII), loans 
offered by banks and (loans2dep) and pfc. 
 
4.2. Co-integration 
The cointegration has been tested using Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test and Kao test for ROA 
and ROE with different equations series within the numbers of parameters accepted by the software 
system. See table 2 below. 
 
Pedroni  is not conclusive given the limited number of datasets ( 10 years x 34 banks = 340 ).  Since 
there is a limitation in term of number of variables to be tested under PEDRONI. Therefore, we can 
conclude that there is cointegration with 7 variables in the two series 5 and 6: ( ROE? NII? NNII? 
L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP? ) and ( ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP? ) 
There is cointegration according to PP-Statistic only for both series 4 and 5 (with both ROE and 
ROA ). 
 
According to Kao, there is one cointegration vector between all the independent variables either 
with ROE or ROA . 
 
Table 1: Pedroni test for ROE and ROA with different variables 
 Pedroni Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  Statistic Prob Result 
Serie 1 N_ROA? P_NII? P_NNII? 
Group rho-Statistic  4.687312  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -5.147085  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.035927  0.5143 No cointegration 
Series 2 
N_ROA? P_NII? P_NNII? 
LOANS2DEP? PFC? P_OPEX? INF? 
Group rho-Statistic  10.00988  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -38.83295  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic -5.642727  0.0000 Cointegration 
Series 3 
ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? 
OPEX? 
Group rho-Statistic  8.501002  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -14.24239  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.212188  0.5840 No cointegration 
Series 4 
ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? 
OPEX? S2GDP?  
Group rho-Statistic  9.601398  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -20.82668  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic -0.236005  0.4067 No cointegration 
Series 5 
ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? 
OPEX? S2GDP?  
Group rho-Statistic  9.364887  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -19.14629  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.971338  0.8343 No cointegration 
Series 6 
ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? 
OPEX? INF?  
Group rho-Statistic  9.717539  1.0000 No cointegration 
Group PP-Statistic -17.76451  0.0000 Cointegration 
Group ADF-Statistic  2.253199  0.9879 No cointegration 
 
 
 
Table 2: Kao test for ROE and ROA with different variables 
KAO Test H0: No cointegration  t-Statistic Prob. 
Serie 1 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? ADF -6.386473  0.0000 
Serie 2 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? ADF -7.074024  0.0000 
Serie 3 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? ADF -6.708735  0.0000 
Serie 4 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT?  ADF -6.593227  0.0000 
Serie 5 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT? S2GDP? ADF -8.609403  0.0000 
Serie 6 ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT? 2GDP? ADF -6.103881  0.0000 
 
 
However, Johansen Fisher cointegration test is not conclusive given the limited number of 
datasets ( 10 years x 34 banks = 340 ), since there is a limitation in term of number of 
variables to be tested. This limitation is equal to only two variables (see table below). 
 
Table 3: Johansen Fisher test for ROE and ROA with different variables 
Johansen Fisher  Fisher Stat.* (from trace test) Prob. Fisher Stat.* (max-eigen test)  
ROA? NII? 
None 361.8 0 311 0 
At most 1 179.6 0 179.6 0 
ROE? NII? 
None 407.1 0 362.5 0 
At most 1 194.4 0 194.4 0   
 
4.3. Estimating Long-run relationship with the Dynamic OLS 
 
The result from Kao test has shown, there is cointegration if  ROA (ROE) is dependent variable. 
Therefore, we have proceeded to the estimation of long run relationship for  ROE and ROA as 
dependent variables.  
So, according to DOLS applied to ROA, The  “Net Interest income” (p_nii), “non-interest income” 
(p_nnii), “Fee & commissions” (pfc), the Inflation (INF) and “Interest rate” (INT) have a significant 
impact over ROA. (See Annex IX Table 1) 
However, for ROE, The “non-interest income” (p_nnii), “Fee & commissions” (pfc),  the operating  
expenses (p_opex), the “stock to GDP” (s2gdp) ratio, the Inflation and “Interest rate” (INT) have a 
significant impact over ROE. (See Annex IX Table 1) 
 
4.4. Panel VECM Granger causality with GMM 
According to GMM ( granger Causality ) applied to ROA, ECT is significant and negative( value = 
-0.817 ) bringing the system to the equilibrium quickly in less than 15 months (  1/0.817  year = 
14.64  months ). (See Annex IX Table 3) 
 
In the case of ROE, according to GMM (Granger Causality), ECT is significant and negative( value 
= -10.06 ) bringing the system to the equilibrium very quickly in less than 35 days ( 1/1.06  year) 
for ROE. (See Annex IX Table 4) 
 
However, the Sagan test (of Overidentifying restrictions) has shown that there is no need for 
overidentifying restrictions, the equation should stay as it is. ( see table below ).  
 H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid 
        chi2(27)     =  28.71994 
        Prob > chi2  =    0.3746 
4.5. Panel VECM with the option Robust 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
We found that The panel VECM  with a robust option applied to ROA shows that the ECT ( z = - 
11.50 ) is highly significant and can bring the system to the equilibrium very quickly ( 8.4 months = 
1/-1.27 year  ) since ECT = -1.27. (see Annex IX table 5.1) 
 
However, the panel VECM with a robust option applied to ROE shows that the ECT is not 
significant ( z = -0.92 ). (see Annex IX table 5.2) 
 
Test of Autocorrelation:This test has shown that there is  autocorrelation between the variables in 
first differenced errors. But zero autocorrelation in second differenced errors ( Annex IX, table 5)   
Wald F-test: In other side, according to Wald F-test, we can conclude that both short-run and lon-
run variables are significant affecting dependent variable ROA. (See Annex IX table 5.1 & 5.2) 
 
4.6. Fixed Effects and/or Random Effects 
 
It is clear that the fixed effects model is a particular case of the random effects model when the va-
riable representing the country effects is non-stochastic. However, as pointed out by Hsiao (1986), 
when the individual effects are correlated with the regressors, the random effects' model produces 
biased estimations of coefficients. 
 
Table 4: List of used variables 
List of 
Variables 
“Fee and 
commissions” 
“Net non-
interest 
income” 
Inflation  Interest 
rate 
Net 
Interest 
Income 
S2GDP 
FE / ROA NS* Significant Significant significant NS* NS* 
RE / ROA NS* NS* Significant NS* NS* NS* 
       
FE / ROE NS* NS* Significant Significant NS* NS* 
RE / ROE NS* NS* NS* NS* NS* Significant 
NS* - Stands for Non- Significant 
 
For ROA, according to the FE test, the “Fee and commissions” (pfc) has a non-significant impact 
on ROA ( t-ratio=0.45 ). At the same time the “Net non-interest income” ( p_nnii ), Inflation and 
Interest rate have a significant impact on ROA. Surprisingly, the Net Interest Income ( p_nii ) seems 
not to have a significant impact on the return to Assets of the bank, this result suggests, the fact that 
income is so stable at the point is not making,  that much, a big change in the profitability of the 
bank.  
However, the RE, has shown that the pfc still has non-significant impact on ROA ( t-ratio=0.09 ). 
At the same time Inflation has a significant impact on ROA, but not the Interest rate. 
The FE, has shown that the pfc still has non-significant impact on ROE ( t-ratio=1.45 ). At the same 
time Inflation and Interest rate have a significant impact on ROE. However, the RE has shown that 
the pfc still has non-significant impact on ROE ( t-ratio=-0.42 ). At the same time Inflation and In-
terest rate have a significant impact on ROE, surprisingly, the stock to GDP ( s2gdp ) has a signifi-
cant negative impact . 
In the end, Haussman test – Between FE and RE, has shown that FE is preferred. Since Fixed Effect 
is chosen, then to overcome heteroscedasticity problem. 
In other side, we have estimated the Fixed Effect with the option Robust, We can notice that the pfc 
still has non-significant impact on ROA ( t-ratio=-0.40 ). At the same time only Interest rate has a 
significant impact on ROA. 
 
4.7. PMG estimation 
 
We assume that the long-run ROA ( and ROE ) function is depending on the list of the independent 
variables: 
 
a- Intrinsic bank variables:  p_nii  p_nnii  loans2dep  pfc  p_opex 
b- Variables of the country:  INF  INT  s2gdp 
 
In this context, the PMG model allows for heterogeneous short-run dynamics and common long-run 
income and inflation elasticity. Often only the long-run parameters are of interest. The default 
results of the PMG option include the long-run parameter estimates and the averaged short-run 
parameter estimates. 
 
Table 5: PMG estimation of ROE against different variables 
Group of Variables ECT Coef. Std. Err z  P>|z| 
ROE against P_NII  P_NII .299729 .1049388  2.86  0.004 
Short Run -.451026 .09044 - 4.99  0.000 
ROE against P_NII and P_NNII             P_NII 1.088761  .2542182  4.28  0.000 
P_NNII 9.631548  1.378819  6.99  0.00 
Short Run -.1321011  .1207728  -1.09  0.274 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII 
and loans2dep 
P_NII 3.718487  .5086523  7.31  0.000 
P_NNII 3.307328  .3283975  10.07  0.000 
loans2dep -40.14494  6.070718  -6.61  0.000 
Short Run -.1314092  .0865735  -1.52  0.129 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII, loans2dep 
and pfc 
The result is not converging. After a number of Iterations equal to 
307: log likelihood = -623.5775 (not concave) 
Hessian has become unstable or asymmetric – r(504); 
ROA against P_NII, P_NNII, loans2dep 
and pfc 
The result is not converging. After a number of Iterations equal to 
49, the system became unstable. 
Iteration 49: log likelihood = 366.24916 (not concave) 
Hessian has become unstable or asymmetric – r(504); 
 
 
 
In the output, the estimated long-run Net Interest Income and Net non-interest Income are 
significantly positive, as expected, but the Loans to deposit is significantly negative and that 
contradicts what it is expected from the theory. The latter result suggests that we need to do more 
investigation like adding more parameter.  However, the error-correction speed of adjustment 
parameter, ECT, is not significant in the short-run since it is less that one. 
Many tests have been driven to see the impact on the equilibrium, but the estimation was not 
converging. Hessian has become unstable or asymmetric for eleven test based on ROE against 
different variables  (See table “Hessian test for ROE” in the Appendix 4.).   
The same tests has been driven with the variable ROA by adding the country parameters, the system 
still indicate no convergence. 
We conclude that, under PMG, the country variables are not driving the estimation to the 
convergence for both ROE and ROA. 
 
4.8. MG estimation 
In this section we will focus only on the case of ROE since the ROA is less pertinent in regards to 
the results above.  Also, we got a certain difficulties to find a convergence of the system, so many 
tests have been conducted to check this convergence. 
 
Table 6: MG estimation of ROE against different variables 
 ECT Coef. Std. Err z  P>|z| 
1. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and  
loans2dep 
P_NII -11.72176 6.855997  1.71  0.087 
P_NNII 13.90954  13.47139  1.03  0.302 
loans2dep -36.26257  54.56031  -0.66  0.506 
Short Run .3393738 .2541827  1.34  0.182 
2. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep 
And pfc 
P_NII 13.55682 15.18894 0.89  0.372 
P_NNII 37.51473 15.73057 2.38 0.017 
loans2dep -44.30625 36.6837 -1.21 0.227 
pfc -47.75327 39.6032 -1.21 0.228 
Short Run -.9045947 .4411846 -2.05 0.040 
3. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  P_NII 2.227262 4.173176 0.53 0.594 
Pfc and p_opex P_NNII 21.44796 7.070477 3.03 0.002 
loans2dep -1.729145 4.323557 -0.40 0.689 
pfc 6.307825 7.47958 0.84 0.399 
p_opex -9.163953 8.264326 -1.11 0.267 
Short Run -.558977 .2314505 -2.42  0.016 
4. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  
pfc,p_opex and s2gdp INF 
P_NII -.028823 2.18011 -0.0 0.98 
P_NNII 34.72529 23.12636 1.50 0.133 
loans2dep (omitted) 
pfc -2.74864 2.40032 -1.15 0.252 
p_opex -63.5301 48.71464 -1.30 0.192 
s2gdp .7064369 .4016413 1.76 0.079 
Short Run -.622536 .176414 -3.5 0.000 
5. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  
pfc,p_opex, s2gdp and INF 
P_NII -9.758587 6.630236 -1.47 0.141 
P_NNII 646.6086 637.4088 1.01 0.310 
loans2dep (omitted) 
pfc -1.357228  .7918515 -1.71  0.087 
p_opex -.9827669 4.032312 -0.24 0.807 
s2gdp -13.67097 14.20871 -0.96 0.336 
INF -2.873012 3.354447 -0.86 0.392 
Short Run -1.017488 .21978 -4.6 0.000 
6. ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  
pfc,p_opex, s2gdp, INF and INT 
P_NII -2.93689 2.740071 -1.07 0.284 
P_NNII 5.381712 3.398399 1.58 0.113 
loans2dep (omitted) 
pfc -.6525535 .466491 -1.40 0.162 
p_opex 1.159585 2.440436 0.48 0.635 
s2gdp .5569582 .4024769 1.38 0.166 
INF -3.445969 2.311637 -1.49 0.136 
INT -.3576358 .6528221 -0.55 0.584 
Short Run -1.496663 .3834661 -3.90 0.000 
 
 
Following the table above, we can say that: 
1. For the second and the third equation, the Net non-interest income has a significant impact on the 
ROE with a positive effect.  
2. The results are more likely to be interpreted as non pertinent because the betas coefficients of Net 
interest income and loans to deposit are negative and non significant for the equation one, while the 
results are not significant for the equation 4, 5, & 6.  
However, the ECT is significant and negative, making the system coming back to the equilibrium. 
So, the system is sensitive to the variables in the short run ( ECT = -1.017488 & -1.496663).  
4.9. Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE) 
The following 4 variables have a significant impact over ROE: the “Net non-interest income”, “Fee 
& commissions”, the operating  expenses and the “stock to GDP” ratio. The ECT = -0.5 has also a 
significant impact in the short run bringing quickly the system to the equilibrium. ( see table below ) 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 7: DFE estimation of ROE and ROA against different variables 
 ECT Coef. Std. Err z  P>|z| 
1. ROE against  
P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep, 
pfc,p_opex, s2gdp, INF and INT 
P_NII .6663306 .3593288 1.85 0.064 
P_NNII 28.40582 3.962096 7.17 0.000 
loans2dep 31.48614 19.77322 1.59 0.111 
pfc 5.63143 2.510795 2.24 0.025 
p_opex, -26.88961 4.544601 -5.92 0.000 
s2gdp -.1667506 .0606875 -2.75 0.006 
INF 3.247689 1.787376 1.82 0.069 
INT 1.268269  .7943819 1.60 0.110 
Short Run -.4978824 .0599469 -8.31 0.000 
2. ROA against  
P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep, 
pfc,p_opex, s2gdp, INF and INT 
P_NII -2.282186 1.393989 -1.64 0.102 
P_NNII 17.44481 12.29288 1.42 0.156 
loans2dep 93.39408 70.00958 1.33 0.182 
pfc -2.165978 7.641163 -0.28 0.777 
p_opex, -17.79109 14.52365 -1.22 0.221 
s2gdp .3005146 .2307684 1.30 0.193 
INF -7.12723 6.895139 -1.03 0.301 
INT 4.143309 2.818964 1.47 0.142 
Short Run .0056443 .0021776 2.59 0.010 
 
 
All variables have no significant impact over ROA. Thus, this equation will not be reported as ac-
ceptable equation. However, the ECT = 0.056 has a significant impact bringing the system to the 
equilibrium after 17.9 years. This seems to be quite high since some bank assets investment would 
be in very long term period. (see table above). 
 
In the end, we have considered the null hypothesis (H0) as PMG is preferred or MG and PMG are 
consistent, but MG is inefficient. The Haussman Test between MG and PMG has shown that the 
calculated Haussman statistic is 0.00 and is distributed CHI Squared. So, we concluded that the 
PMG estimator, the efficient estimator under the null hypothesis, is preferred. 
The same test has been conducted between MG and DFE. The Results indicate that the 
simultaneous equation bias is minimal for these data and, for our set of data, we concluded that the 
DFE model is preferred over the MG model. 
4.10. Summary results 
 
This paper has analysed the role of both Interest rate and “Fee & Commissions” on the return of the 
European banks (ROA and ROE) based on Multivariate Analysis. 
We started applying the “Unit root” and the “Co-integration” then, we have estimated the long-run 
relationship with Dynamic OLS (DOLS), which has given the long term equations for ROA and 
ROE as follows: 
 
ROA = 0.22 NII + 0.17 NNII  + 0.16 LOANS2DEP + 0.83 PFC - 0.12 P_OPEX + 0.08 INF - 0.52 INT - 0.001 S2GDP (1) 
            ( 3.8 )          ( 2.6 )            ( 0.4 )                          ( 1.6 )        ( -1.4 )                 ( 3.3 )         (-3.6)         (-0.9 ) 
 
ROE = - 0.01 NII + 18.0 NNII - 7.29 LOANS2DEP - 7.71 PFC - 19 P_OPEX + 4.35 INF + 2.01 INT - 0.06 S2GDP (2) 
              ( -0.1 )       ( 6.7 )          ( -0.5 )                       ( -3.8 )          ( -5.5 )             ( 4.2 )          ( 3.5)          (-2.1 ) 
 
 
Furthermore, the panel VECM Granger causality (with simple GMM and with "Robust" option), 
Fixed Effect and Random Effect, PMG estimation, MG estimation have been applied as well. 
 
Then the Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE)  we are presenting in its long term equation form since the 
latter is preferred under Haussman test: 
 
ROE =  0.66 NII + 28.4 NNII + 31.5 LOANS2DEP + 5.6 PFC - 26.9 P_OPEX + 3.24 INF + 1.26 INT - 0.17 S2GDP (3) 
              ( 1.85 )      ( 7.17 )          ( 1.6 )                           ( 2.2 )       ( -5.9 )                ( 1.8 )         (1.6 )          ( -2.8 ) 
Those results are showing clearly that the banks return is positively correlated with the “non-interest 
income”, “Fee & commissions”, the operating expenses and the “stock to GDP”. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We investigate the evolution of profitability for European banks between 2000 and 2009. The 
profitability equations are given above.  Several conclusions come up to the front. 
 
Our empirical results finish up with two major findings regarding the evolution of profitability in 
the European banking sector between 2000 and 2009.  A note worthy first finding is that the 
improvement in profitability (see ROA in the equation (1)) in the European  banks seems to be more 
related to  the “net-interest income” and “non-interest income. 
 
Consequently, countries with high inflation level, will have more advantage in terms of profitability, 
as the latter will grow faster than those with low inflation level. This can lead to a situation where 
the first ones overpass the latter ones, meaning the risk of absence of convergence in terms of 
profitability. 
 
We know that European authorities aimed to promote competition in the markets of goods and ser-
vices to improve efficiency and this will be accelerated by the higher competitive pressures exerted 
in the banking sector. Therefore, the observed improvement in profitability could not be in accor-
dance with this expectation, as a consequence of the increase in competition. 
 The second finding is the convergence in profitability across European countries, in fact, according 
to GMM ( Granger Causality ), the ECT  for ROE  is significant and has a negative sign ( value = -
10.06 ) bringing the system to the equilibrium very quickly in less than 35 days (  1/1.06  year). At 
the same time, the panel VECM with a robust option applied to ROA shows that the ECT ( z = - 
11.50 ) is highly significant and can bring the system to the equilibrium very quickly ( 8.4 months = 
1/-1.27 year  ) since ECT = -1.27. 
 
Besides that, Wald F-test applied to ROA, concludes that the short-run variables and the long-run 
variables are also significant, affecting the dependent variable ROA. 
 
An intuitive explanation would be to link the changes in profitability with the changes in the size of 
the country’s financial market in regard to GDP. The three equations [(1), (2), (3)] show a negative 
sign of the beta of Stock to GDP (S2GDP), the bigger the market the bigger impact on the ROA or 
ROE.  This phenomenon appears to be counter intuitive, so other investigations should be done by 
adding the number of transactions in the stock market, for example. 
 
The results suggest a positive influence of “non-interest income “ and the interest rate on the banks’ 
profitability, and those two parameters are not outweighed by additional requirements of provisions 
and capital that supervisory authorities establish to control bank risk. 
 
However the “fee & commissions” do not have a significant impact over the profitability of the 
European banks. This point should raise the question about the role of the European banks, as agent 
or intermediary that they are supposed to enhance the efficiency of real economy. 
  
First, the interpretation of the result in terms of the impact of “fee & commissions” is not straight 
forward. First of all, the equation (3) and (4), for ROE, show an opposite sign of betas for “fee & 
commissions” ( PFC , positive for (3) and negative for (4) with a significant impact for both ). That 
is to say, that the result about the role of the bank as an intermediary did not confirm a clear positive 
impact on the profitability of the bank measured by the ROE. 
 
The results have shown that DFE is preferred over the MG and MG is preferred to PMG. Besides 
that, the “non-interest income”, “Fee & commissions”, the operating expenses and the “stock to 
GDP” ratio. The ECT = -0.5 has also a significant impact in the short run bringing the system back 
to equilibrium quickly. 
 According to DOLS, the results show that the “Fee & commissions” are not significant on ROA but 
significant on ROE. However, the “Fee & commissions”, the “Net Interest income”, the “non-
interest income”, Inflation and interest rate have a significant impact over ROA and ROE. Besides 
that, the operating expenses, the “stock to GDP” ratio, the “Interest rate” have a significant impact 
over ROE. 
Operational expenses (including Overhead) over total assets, play important role as a main determi-
nant of bank profitability. The results show that this variable is significant in determining bank prof-
itability. Like Guru etc. al (2003) and Molyneux and Thorthon (1992) who found a significant rela-
tionship between expenditures and profitability measures, this study also found strong significant 
relationship between Operational expenses with ROA and ROE for both schemes. The tables show 
that “Operational expenses” are negatives and significantly related to profitability for both schemes 
at 5% level of confidence. This finding revealed that efficient expenses management was one of the 
most significant variables in explaining bank profitability. This relationship indicates that high 
overhead expenses reduce the profitability of these two banking schemes. The cardinal rule of fi-
nancial analysis states that the effectiveness and efficiency of bank management is reflected by the 
amount of expenditure incurred in a particular reporting period. For overhead costs such as, salaries 
and the cost of running branch office facilities, the more are the expenses incurred by the bank, the 
less the profit the bank will generate ; an increase in this ratio will decrease the quality of bank 
management, which will translate into lower bank profitability. This result is in line with Maudos 
and Guevera (2003), which found negative correlation between management efficiency and profita-
bility measures in the European Union. 
 
This study found that interest and Inflation have a positive relationship with ROA and ROE of the 
European banking schemes, while negative relationships have been found for the ratio of stock 
market to GDP on both schemes. But no significant relationships were found between all these ma-
croeconomic variables and the profitability measures for both schemes. Profitability of Islamic 
banking schemes and interest banking schemes seem to be less affected by the macroeconomic fac-
tors. 
However, we must mention that our analysis is based on two limitations. The first is that we do not 
consider the implications of deviations from the random walk ( non-stationarity ) of the variables, 
the second is that we have applied the Panel technique based on linear model without knowing if 
the equation is simply linear or not, then the fact that we did not examine the basic economic rea-
sons that grounds the previously mentioned relation, as well as the alternative econometric tech-
niques, non linear panel cross-section time series, that could improve the final results. 
 A fruitful path for the future study is to examine the effect of the GDP growth, and the total value of 
stocks traded divided by GDP, and, in the end, the inclusion of the credit to the private sector by 
deposit money banks divided by GDP in the estimations to improve the explanatory power of the 
models. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The following table is giving the details of the variables used: 
 
Definition of the Variables Name Observation 
Bank specific parameters 
1a. Profitability of the Bank to  equity 
investments 
1b. Return to Assets 
ROE 
ROA 
For Profitability  for each year (over Equity & 
Assets). 
2. Net interest income to total NETINT Total banks’ assets divide this variable in each year. 
3. Banks’ net income to total bank assets as 
measures of banks’ profitability Net 
interest 
NETINC Total banks’ assets divide this variable in each year. 
“fee & commissions” PFC  
4. Income or banks’ interest margin is the 
interest income minus interest expense and 
it captures the profitability of the 
intermediation activity of banks. 
Income Total banks’ assets divide this variable in each year. 
5. LOANS LOANS  
6. Non-interest earnings NONINTER Total banks’ assets divide the  banks’ variable in 
each year. 
7. B7. Banks overhead cost OVHEADC Total banks’ assets divide the  banks’ variable in 
each year. 
Country specific parameters 
8. The inflation rate INFLATION  
9. The ratio of the total domestic assets of 
deposit money banks divided by GDP. 
DBANKA  
10. The interest rate INTRATE The mean of the year 
11. The GDP growth gGDP Annual growth 
12. The size of the stock market is proxied 
by the ratio of the stock market 
capitalization divided by GDP.                                                                             
 
S2GDP  
14. The loans given by banks to GDP loans2dep Total annual loans to GDP 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2 
 
4. - Unit Root 
LLC as a pooled DF or ADF comes as a solution which can be used across different sections in the panel. 
Limitation from assumption: 
1.LLC assumes that the individual processes are cross-sectionally independent. Therefore, this test might neglect the 
significant distortions for the test due to correlations between groups. 
2.The coefficient of the lagged Yi (autoregressive coefficient) is restricted to be homogenous across all units of the panel. 
Hadri 
1.Hadri maintains the two assumptions on LLC. 
2.Hadri differs from other tests. It has a null of stationary rather than non-stationary. In many cases, the test, with non-
stationary as a null, does not result very powerful against relevant alternative hypothesis and fails to reject the null 
hypothesis for many economic series. Hence, Hadri test addresses this problem. 
 
IPS, Im. Pesaran and Shin 
1.The IPS maintains the assumption number 1 on LLC. 
2.The IPS relaxes the assumption number 2 on LLC. IPS extends LLC by allowing heterogeneity on the coefficient of the 
lagged Yi (autoregressive coefficient). It allows different specifications of the parametric values, the residual variance and 
the lag lengths.   
3.The IPS put the restrictive assumption that T should be the same for all cross-sections which requires a balanced panel. 
In the following, we will use only IPS and Hadri tests because of the two limitations of LLC. 
4.1 – Unit root for ROE 
 
a- Using IPS 
 
H0: Non Stationary 
 
Method Im, Pesaran and Shin    Statistic  Prob.** 
The equation: roe?  inf? int? s2gdp? W-stat -7.50905   0.0000 
 
roe? nii? nnii? inf? int? W-stat -9.07897   0.0000 
 
roe? nii? nnii? loans2dep? pfc? W-stat -5.27101   0.0000 
 
P= 0.000 means we have at least one stationary variable, in our case it should be the Inflation. 
  
b- Using Hadri 
 
The maximum of variables accepted through the system is limited to few. As we can not test all the variables in one batch, so we use  
different batches of variables as follow. 
 
1. The tested variables are:  ROE? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? 
 
H0: Stationarity 
 
1. Intermediate results on ROE? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? 
 
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
Hadri Z-stat   1.10799  0.1339 
Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat  12.6607  0.0000 
 
P= 0.13, means that we accept the null, then all those variables are stationary. 
2.  The tested variables are:  ROE? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? 
 
2. Intermediate results on ROE? NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX? 
 
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
Hadri Z-stat   18.6766  0.0000 
Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat  15.9162  0.0000 
 
P= 0.000, we reject the null, means all the variables ROE? NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX? are non stationary. 
 
4.2 – Unit root for ROA 
 
a- Using HADRI: 
 
The tested variables are:   ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? 
 
H0: Stationarity 
 
Intermediate results on ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? 
 
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
Hadri Z-stat  -2.48842  0.9936 
Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat  12.8714  0.0000 
 
b- Using HADRI 
 
The variables are:  ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX? 
 
Intermediate results on ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX? 
 
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
Hadri Z-stat   25.4507  0.0000 
Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat  16.1270  0.0000 
 
We can conclude from above that according to HADRI test, the variables ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX? Toghether and ROE? 
NII? NNII? PFC? OPEX?  are non stationary. 
 
The  variables ROA? NII? NNII? PFC? S2GDP? Are stationary all toghether. 
 
 
 Hessian test for ROE 
 
Hessian has become unstable or asymmetric for eleven test based on ROE against different 
variables  as follows: 
  
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX, INF 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX, INT 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX, INF, INT 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX, INF, and s2gdp 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII,  loans2dep,  pfc and P_OPEX, and s2gdp 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and loans2dep,   INF INT s2gdp 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and loans2dep,   INF INT 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and loans2dep,   INF 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and loans2dep,   INT 
ROE against P_NII, P_NNII and loans2dep,  s2gdp 
  
Appendix 3 
 
5.1 - Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
 
Series:1 N_ROA? P_NII? P_NNII? 
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  4.687312  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -5.147085  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.035927  0.5143 
There is cointegration according to PP-Statistic only. 
 
Series2: N_ROA? P_NII? P_NNII? LOANS2DEP? PFC? P_OPEX? INF? 
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  10.00988  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -38.83295  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic -5.642727  0.0000 
There is cointegration according to PP-Statistic and ADF-Statistic. 
 
Series3: ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? 
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  8.501002  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -14.24239  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.212188  0.5840 
 
Series4: ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP?  
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  9.601398  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -20.82668  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic -0.236005  0.4067 
 
Series:5 ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP?  
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  9.364887  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -19.14629  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic  0.971338  0.8343 
There is cointegration according to PP-Statistic only for both series 4 and 5 ( with both ROE and ROA ). 
 
Series6: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? INF?  
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic  9.717539  1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -17.76451  0.0000 
Group ADF-Statistic  2.253199  0.9879 
There is cointegration according to PP-Statistic only. 
 
PEDRONI  is not conclusive given the limited number of datasets ( 10 years x 34 banks = 340 ).  Since there is a limitation in term of 
number of variables to be tested under PEDRONI. Therefore, we can conclude that there cointegration with 7 variables in the two series 
5 and 6: ( ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP? )  And ( ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? PFC? OPEX? S2GDP? ) 
 
5.2 - KAO Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
 
Case of ROE 
 
Series1: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -6.386473  0.0000 
 
Series2: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -7.074024  0.0000 
 
Series 3: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -6.708735  0.0000 
 
Series 4: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT?  
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -6.593227  0.0000 
 
Series 5: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT? S2GDP? 
Series: ROE? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT? S2GDP? 
 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -8.609403  0.0000 
 
Case of ROA 
 
Series 6: ROA? NII? NNII? L2DEP? OPEX? PFC? INF? INT? S2GDP? 
 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -6.103881 0 
 
According to KAO, there is one cointegration vector between  all the independent variables either with ROE or ROA . 
 
5.3 - Test of cointegration based on Johansen Fisher 
Johansen Fisher is not conclusive given the limited number of datasets ( 10 years x 34 banks = 340 ).  Since there is a limitation in term 
of number of variables to be tested. This limitation is equal to only two variables.  See below, some examples. 
 
Series: ROA? NII? 
None 361.8 0 311 0 
At most 1 179.6 0 179.6 0 
 
Series: ROE? NII? 
 
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.*  Fisher Stat.*  
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob. (from max-eigen test) Prob. 
None 407.1 0 362.5 0 
At most 1 194.4 0 194.4 0 
 
